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ISSUES FOR REVIEW
This appeal concerns two sections of the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act: § 78-14-4, which provides a two-year statute
of limitations and a four-year statute of repose in medical
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malpractice actions, and § 78-14-8, which requires at least 90
days prior written notice of intent before any medical malpractice
suit may be filed.1/
Section 78-14-8 also provides that the limitations or
repose period will be extended by 120 days from the date of the
service of the notice of intent if the notice is served less than
90 days before the expiration of the "applicable" time period.
The issue is whether a notice of intent served less than
90 days before the expiration of the limitations period, but not
less than 90 days before the expiration of the repose period, extends
both periods, as plaintiffs contend, or extends only the limitations
period, as the lower court held.

1/

S 78-14-4 is both a statute of limitations and a statute of
repose.
The two-year period is a statute of limitations
since it procedurally limits the time in which a suit may be
brought but does not determine the substantive right to
bring the suit in the first place. The four-year period is
a statute of repose since it cuts off any right of action
after the passage of a certain period of time, in essence a
substantive determination of the right to bring the action.
Turner, The Counter-Attack to Retake the Citadel Continues:
An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose
in Products Liability, 46 J. Air L. & Com. 449, 476 (1981);"
cited in Maxine Wheaton v. Joseph E. Jack, M. P., Civ. No.
C-82-0039W, slip op. (D. Utah, August 9, 1982) (Memorandum
Decision upholding the constitutionality of § 78-14-4).
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

These are the relevant portions of the two statutes:
78-14-4. Statute of Limitations-ExceptionsApplication,
No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be brought unless it is commenced
within two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not
to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence.
78-14-8.

Notice of Intent to Commence Action.

No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be initiated unless and until
the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant
or his executor or successor, at least ninety
days1 prior notice of intent to commence an
action. . . .
If the notice is served less
than ninety days prior to the expiration of the
applicable time period, the time for commencing
the malpractice action against the health
care provider shall be extended to 120 days
from the date of service of notice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These defendants find plaintiffs1 Statement of the Case
to be substantially accurate and, in accordance with Rule 24(b),
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, accept it for purposes of this
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The statute of limitations and the statute of repose
are distinct time constraints, each serving a different purpose,
each of which must be met.

Satisfying the limitations period

does not excuse satisfaction of the repose period.

Nor does the

extension of the limitations period necessarily extend the repose
period.

Section 78-14-8 grants a 120-day extension from the

date of the service of a notice of intent only when that notice of
intent is served less than 90 days before the "applicable" time
period expires.

While the limitations period in this case was

"applicable," that is, in need of extension, and was so extended,
the repose period was not "applicable," not needing extension, and
hence, was not extended.

This action is, therefore, barred by

the statute of repose.
ARGUMENT
This action is barred by the statute of repose unless
the repose period was extended by the notice of intent.

That

notice was served less than 90 days before the expiration of the
limitations period, but not within 90 days of the expiration of
the repose period. The only issue is whether the 120-day extension
of the limitations period also extended the repose period.

If it

did, this action was timely commenced and the lower court should
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be reversed.

If it did not, this action is barred and the lower

court should be affirmed.
I.
Several dates are relevant here. The alleged malpractice
occurred on March 1, 1981.
Ballinger, 601 P.2d

The "injury," as defined in Foil v.

144, 148 (Utah 1979), was discovered by

plaintiffs on November 27, 1982. The notice of intent was served
on November 20, 1984, and this action was filed on March 12, 1985.
The limitations period, absent any extension, would
have expired on November 27, 1984 —
discovery.

two years after the date of

The repose period, absent any extension, would have

expired on March 1, 1985 —

four years after the date of the

alleged malpractice.
The notice of intent was served 7 days before the
expiration of the limitations period and 101 days before the
expiration of the repose period.

It created a 90-day "waiting

period" from November 20, 1984 to February 18, 1985, during which
an action could not be filed.

The notice of intent also served

to extend the limitations period by 120 days from the date of
service, that is, until March 19, 1985.

Between February 19,

the end of the "waiting period," and March 1, 1985, there was a
12-day grace period

in which plaintiffs could have filed this

- 7 -

action and met both the unextended repose period, which expired
March 1, and the extended limitations period, which expired March
19.
II.
The limitations period and the repose period represent
a legislative compromise between the desire to provide a reasonable
period of time for an injured person to commence a malpractice
action and the desire to limit that time to a specific period for
which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably
and accurately calculated.

See, § 78-14-2; Allen v. Intermountain

Health Care, Inc. , 635 P.2d 30, 32 (Utah 1981); Hargett v. Limberg,
598 F. Supp. 152, 157 (D. Utah 1984).

The limitations period

expresses the first legislative desire, the repose period the
second.
A plaintiff must, of course, meet both statutory time
periods.

One who discovers his injury five years after the date

of the malpractice and then files an action is barred by the statute
of repose, even though he is within the statute of limitations.
Conversely, one who files an action three years after discovery
of his injury, but within four years of the date of the malpractice,
is barred by the statute of limitations, although within the
statute of repose.

Meeting one of the statutory time periods

- 8 -

does not relieve a plaintiff of the obligation of meeting the
other.
These plaintiffs contend that extending both time periods
is unnecessary.

They argue that since they extended, and met,

the limitations period, they necessarily extended, and met, the
repose period.

That argument is no more persuasive than the

argument that meeting one statutory period meets the other.
Section 78-14-8 provides that "if the notice is served
less than ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable time
period, the time for commencing the malpractice action . . .
shall be extended to 120 days from the date of the service of
notice.11

The word "applicable" is key.
Plaintiffs contend that the "applicable" time period is

the first time period to expire.

The lower court held that the

"applicable" time period was the period which needed to be extended;
that is, the time period which would otherwise expire during the
90-day waiting period after service of the notice of intent.

In

this case, the limitations period was in need of extension because
plaintiffs could not commence their action until the expiration
of the waiting period on February 18, 1985.

The limitations

period which, unless extended, would have expired on November 27,
1984, was extended by § 78-14-8 for 120 days, until March 19,
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1985.

But that extension

had no effect on the expiration of

the repose period.
The repose period
hence, was never

the

never

needed

to be extended

"applicable" period.

Plaintiffs

and,
could

have filed this action at any time between the expiration of the
waiting period on February
repose period

on March

18, 1985, and the expiration

1, 1985, and would

of

the

have met both the

limitations and the repose period.
Nothing

obligated

plaintiffs to use the full 120-day

period given to them in connection with
limitations period.

the extension

of

the

That 120-day period was merely permissive

and did not prevent them from filing at any time after the 90-day
waiting period expired without using the entire 120 days.
Plaintiffs

court's

decision

could lead to a dilemma from which there is no relief.

However,

plaintiffs

contend

themselves

never

that the lower

faced

this d i l e m m a .

In

their

hypothetical, a prospective plaintiff served a notice of intent
90 days before the repose period expired and 89 days before the
limitations period expired.
plaintiff could never

In that situation, the prospective

timely

commence an action, because

waiting period had not expired yet the repose period had.
this, plaintiffs conclude that the lower court's
of § 78-14-8 is "nonsensical."

From

interpretation

[Appellant's Brief at 10].
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the

What is nonsensical is that any plaintiff would serve a
notice of intent on the assumed date, since if that plaintiff
waited but one day, or served it but one day earlier, the problem
would not exist.

For example, a notice served on October 5 would

give an additional 120 days as to both the limitations and the
repose periods, since it would have been filed within 90 days of
the expiration date of each.

Alternatively, a notice served on

October 3 would give plaintiff a one-day window in which to file.
Plaintiffs' hypothetical presumes a self-inflicted dilemma which
common sense could have avoided, rather than an unavoidable
situation created by the statutes.
Plaintiffs had two years and 101 days to commence their
action after discovering the alleged negligence.

They could have

filed at any time between February 19 and March 1, 1985, and met
both the statute of limitations and the statute of repose.

They

did not do so, not because of circumstances beyond their control,
but because they chose not to do so.

CONCLDSION
In conclusion, defendants Van Steeter

and

Toyota

respectfully submit that the decision of the lower court granting
summary judgment in their favor should be affirmed.
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